AN ANALYSIS OF THE TAX BUOYANCY RATES IN PAKISTAN by Rasheed, Farooq
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TAX 
BUOYANCY RATES IN 
PAKISTAN 
 
Farooq Rasheed 
College of Management Sciences 
PAF- Karachi Institute of Economics & Technology 
Email: Farooqeco@yahoo.com 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 By using econometric techniques for estimating tax elasticities, this paper finds 
significant but low tax buoyancy rates for GDP, M0 and volume of trade. Surprisingly, 
the theoretically important factor of tax evasion (SFTR) was found to be ineffective. This 
indicates that SFTR is not an adequate measure of tax evasion. There is no significant 
association between tax revenue growth and investment, credit, public debt and inflation. 
This illustrates the weakness of the tax regime in Pakistan. 
 
 
I. Introduction: 
  
 Pakistan’s economy in the second quarter of 2006 has continued an upswing for 
the fifth quarter running. This means that, technically, the economy has come out of an 
extended period of recession. The statistics given confirm that there is an ample evidence 
of recovery, but sustainability of this growth remains uncertain. Low savings and 
investment rates, persistent unemployment, poverty and need for improvement in tax 
revenue collection require further attention by policy makers. 
 
 Conceptually, one of the measures of the responsiveness of tax revenues to 
changes in the base is the ‘elasticity’ or buoyancy rate that seeks to relate the percentage 
change in tax revenue to a percentage change in various macro variables that affect tax 
receipts. 
 
 A very common problem in the analysis on tax responsiveness is the frequent 
changes in the policies of tax collection. In estimating the built-in elasticity of a tax, 
therefore, either the time series data on tax revenues needs to be adjusted to eliminate the 
effects of discretionary tax measures, or a suitable estimation methodology has to be 
adopted, or a combination of the two has to be used. The most appropriate method would 
clearly depend upon the availability, nature and reliability of information on tax revenues 
and discretionary changes in the tax structure. 
 
 In the light of the above, this paper presents an analysis of the estimates of tax 
buoyancy in relation to changes in various independent variables using an econometrics 
approach.  
 
II. Literature Review:  
 
 A study by Chaudhry, (2001) provides a review of optimal tax theory to devise an appropriate tax 
policy for the agriculture sector of Pakistan. Optimal tax theories expect  buoyancy rates to be high and 
significant. The author has suggested that if local bodies are made responsible for tax collection then 
additional costs can be avoided and  buoyancy rates can be high. 
 
 The literature suggests that economic development is expected to bring about both an increased 
demand for public expenditure (Tanzi, 1987) and a larger capacity to meet these demands (Musgrave, 
1969). Musgrave argues that the lack of availability of ‘tax handles’ might limit revenue collection at low 
levels of income and these limitations should become less severe as the economy develops. Effectiveness 
of measures for increasing tax revenue must be estimated in order to identify their success. Analysis of 
buoyancy rate is a means for evaluating the effectiveness of policies for improvement in tax revenue. Since 
gross investment is one of the components of aggregate demand therefore tax buoyancy with respect to 
investment should also be estimated. 
 
 There is a consensus in the literature on the use of per capita income as a proxy 
for the overall level of development. (Bahl, 1971 and Ansari, 1982). A higher per capita 
income reflecting a higher level of development is held to indicate a higher capacity to 
pay taxes as well as a greater capacity to levy and collect tax revenue (Chelliah, 1971). 
But it is also possible that per capita income cannot reflect the real impact on tax 
buoyancy due to uneven income distribution in the economy. Therefore in this study 
income per capita is not selected as an independent variable. Today the human 
development index (HDI) is sometimes considered to be a better indicator of welfare than 
income per capita. However due to non-availability of timely HDI data, HDI is also not 
taken into account in this study. 
 
 Tanzi in a study emphasizes that trade taxes have historically been a major source 
of government revenue during the early stages of economic development because they 
are easier to collect than domestic income and consumption taxes when tax 
administration is rudimentary and tax handles are limited, (Tanzi 1989). This is also 
supported by a study by Linn and Weitzel (1990) which shows that the administrative 
ease with which trade taxes can be collected makes them an attractive source of 
government revenue when administrative capabilities are scarce (Linn and Weitzel, 
1990). Therefore volume of trade has been given importance as a determinant of tax 
revenue specially in developing countries at early stages of development. 
 
 The existence of a large public debt has important implications for the taxation 
potential of a country. With a large debt, the government needs to raise revenues 
necessarily. When the interest on the debt exceeds net borrowing plus the possible 
reduction in non- interest expenditure, the level of taxation must go up unless the rate of 
growth of the economy is high enough to neutralize this increase. Therefore public debt 
and government spending play a role in determining the extent to which countries may 
take advantage of their taxable capacity (Tanzi, 1987). Therefore this study also 
considered debt as a determinant. Public debt may be financed through inflationary 
financing, which results in acceleration of inflationary pressure. As a result the real value 
of tax collection falls because of the inevitable lag between the date the tax is due and its 
date of collection (Tanzi, 1988, 1989, Blejer & Cheasty, 1989; Linn & Weitzel, 1990). 
Therefore, the size of the public debt is expected to be a positive determinant of the 
buoyancy rate. 
 
 A country’s economic structure is one of the factors that could be expected to 
influence the level of taxation (Tanzi, 1992). An economy with a large GDP share of 
agriculture value added is expected to generate low tax revenues. Due to political 
reasons, it is usually difficult to directly tax the agricultural sector in Pakistan, though it 
is often very heavily taxed in many implicit ways, e.g., through import quotas, tariffs, 
controlled prices for output, and overvalued exchange rates (Bird, 1978; Ahmad and 
Stern, 1991). 
 
 Tax evasion is considered to be of serious concern to those dealing with taxation 
issues of a country because of several reasons, the major being that it results in the loss of 
revenue. Pyle (1989) points out that one of the implications of the existence of the 
underground economy is that some income goes untaxed and also certain indirect taxes 
are also evaded. Thus in this study a short fall in tax revenues (SFTR)1  will be considered 
as a proxy to represent tax evasion. These shortfalls in tax revenues are normally 
inclusive of those shortfalls that are due to tax avoidance but not tax evasion. The 
expected sign of buoyancy rate for tax revenue due to SFTR is negative. 
 
Estimating income tax elasticity is useful for determining the extent of the sensitivity and 
response of the tax system to the changes that take place in the composition and value of 
GDP. Moreover, a quantitative measure of the effectiveness of tax policy in terms of 
stimulating public resources, is given by the relationship between the proportional 
changes in tax revenue and those of national income (Harvey, 1993), and this relationship 
is measured by income tax elasticity. The elasticity of yield is an important aspect of the 
tax structure (Goode, 1984), and overall measures of elasticity and buoyancy may be 
useful as a descriptive tool, which may lead to further questions and point to a more 
detailed examination of particular taxes in certain countries (Ahmad and Stern, 1991). 
The larger the value of the elasticity or buoyancy, the faster is the rise in the tax ratio. 
This is because the effect of factors such as progressive elements in the tax system, 
distribution of income, and composition of bases, (which are in turn affected by 
discretionary tax measures and economic growth), on the size of the elasticity are felt on 
the tax ratio, so that countries with a tax elasticity greater than unity must have a rising 
tax ratio through time (Choudhry 1979), provided GDP is growing. 
 
 Nominal variables are affected by prices. Therefore variables such as M0, M1, M2, 
and CPI have been also included in this study. These variables are measures of 
inflationary impact on tax buoyancy. 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
1  Measured by taking the difference of expected total tax revenues aimed at the 
beginning of the fiscal year and total tax revenue finally collected at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
 
  
 
 
 The rationale behind this study is to identify factors underlying GDP growth rates 
as determinants of tax buoyancy. Section III will explain data and methodology; section 
IV provides results and section V will conclude the study. 
 
III. Data & Methodology: 
  
 For the estimations of buoyancy rates, the literature suggests that over the years 
following four approaches have been used frequently: 
 
(a) Constant Rate Structure; 
(b) Proportional Adjustment; 
(c) Divisia Index; and 
(d) Econometric Methods.  
 
 The constant rate structure method involves the generation of a simulated tax 
revenue series for a given reference year and estimates of the tax base for subsequent 
years. It is relatively the most accurate approach. It is evident, however, that such a 
procedure will usually be extremely cumbersome if it is applied to the full range of tax 
instruments that exists in a country and data requirements are also necessarily very heavy. 
As a consequence, the constant rate structure method is rarely used for analytical 
purposes. 
 
 For most analytical work, one of the other three approaches is adopted. The 
Divisia index and the econometric methods are least demanding in terms of data 
requirements, since they rely mainly on actual tax collections; therefore they measure at 
aggregate levels. However, both these methods are subject to certain limitations. In the 
Divisia index approach, its calculation is predicated on the conditions that the underlying 
tax function is continuously differentiable and homogeneous, preferably linear and 
homogeneous. Although these may not seem to be particularly demanding conditions, 
there are serious doubts about their validity when the aggregate tax to which it is being 
applied comprises of a non-constant set of items on which taxes are being levied. If the 
estimation is being done over a sufficiently long period of time, experience shows that 
the composition of the tax base will exhibit significant change. 
 
 
 The proportional adjustment method cannot be applied to broad tax categories 
such as excise or customs, but only to individual products within these categories. This 
method is useful for instance in cases where revenue-neutral tax simplifications are being 
worked out and disaggregated data on tax rates and tax bases are available. It cannot, on 
the other hand, make do only with actual tax collection data as is possible with the 
Divisia index method. It requires the use of budget estimates of tax yield arising out of 
discretionary changes. Such data are often not available in many countries, and thus 
restricts the applicability of this method. 
 
 The econometric models, which often rely on using dummy variables to capture 
discretionary changes in tax rates and tax structures, cannot be used if discretionary tax 
changes have been made frequently in the past, since this leads to an excessive reduction 
in the degrees of freedom and thereby to the efficiency of the estimators. Even if the 
number of such discretionary changes is relatively small, serious problems can arise in 
the specification of the estimation equations unless there is information on the nature of 
the tax changes and the extent to which their effects are independent of one another.  
 
 Keeping in mind the difficulties that exist in these methodologies, this study will 
use the econometric method. It is our judgement that during the period under study major 
changes have not occured in the text regume. This is a view open to contest, however. 
 
 Tax buoyancy will be estimated within the following relationships… 
(i) Tax Revenue and GDP. 
(ii) Tax Revenue and high powered money  (M0). 
(iii) Tax Revenue and narrow money supply (M1). 
(iv) Tax Revenue and broad money supply (M2). 
(v) Tax Revenue and CPI. 
(vi) Tax Revenue and Gross Investment. 
(vii) Tax Revenue and Volume of Trade. 
(viii) Tax Revenue and Tax Evasion (SFTR) 
(ix)  Tax Revenue and Public Debt 
 
 The required data has been taken from various issues of Pakistan Federal Budget 
reports, IFS, SBP annual reports and Economic Survey of Pakistan on annual basis from 
the period 1980 to 2004. All data is in nominal form as the effect of CPI and monetary 
aggregates is separately measured. 
 
 The following linear regression equation has been estimated to calculate 
buoyancy rates. 
 
 Ln (TR) = aj + bj Ln (j) …………………. (1) 
Where TR is the tax revenue, “b” is the tax buoyancy of the “jth” variable. “j” being GDP, 
money supply, CPI, Gross Investment, Volume of Trade, Public Debt and SFTR. 
 
 
IV. Results: 
a. Unit Root Tests. 
Table 1 presents the results of unit root test for all series in log form with base 
exponential. 
Table 1 
Unit Root Tests - Augmented Dicky Fukller test (ADF) 
Calculated on Linear Deterministic Trend in each Data series with lag 1. 
 
 
 
 
Variables ADF Test Ho Stationary at?  
Ln GDP -13.25 Reject First Difference  
Ln Tax Revenue -9.12 Reject First Difference  
Ln Money Supply M0 -9.15 Reject First Difference  
Ln Money Supply M1 -12.41 Reject First Difference  
Ln Money Supply M2 -11.57 Reject First Difference  
Ln CPI -7.24 Reject First Difference  
Ln Gross Investment -14.55 Reject First Difference  
Ln Volume of Trade -7.95 Reject First Difference  
Ln Public Debt -12.72 Reject First Difference  
SFTR -0.34 Accepted Level  
 
 
 
  5% critical value is –1.96 Ho: There is a unit root thus no stationarity.  
 
 For all the variables the null hypothesis is rejected except for (SFTR). The results 
show that except for SFTR, all the other series are stationary at the first difference, which 
means that the possibility for co-integration between them can be tested. The positive 
results of the co-integration test explain the existence of a long run relationship. In the 
subsequent analysis SFTR has been dropped. 
 
b. Co-integration tests. 
Table 2 shows the results of co-integration tests. 
Table 2 
Co-Integration Tests 
Assuming linear deterministic trend in data with no constant. All the data is in natural log 
form. 
 
Pair: Tax Revenue with… Likelihood Value Ho Co-
integrating?  
GDP 21.410 Rejected Yes  
Money Supply (M0) 16.319 Rejected Yes  
Money Supply (M1) 18.922 Rejected Yes  
Money Supply (M2) 9.393 Accepted No  
CPI 16.641 Rejected Yes  
Gross Investment 20.317 Rejected Yes  
Volume of Trade 16.122 Rejected Yes  
Public Debt 18.448         Rejected         Yes  5% 
critical value is 15.41                         Ho: There is no co-integration prevails  
 
 
 
 From Table 2 it is seen that all the series are co-integrating with tax revenue 
except money supply (M2). This suggests that there exists a long run relationship between 
the pairs tax revenue & GDP, tax revenue & M0, tax revenue & M1, tax revenue & CPI, 
tax revenue & gross investment, tax revenue & public debt and tax revenue & volume of 
trade. The lack of a long run relationship between broad money supply (M2) and tax 
revenue is unexpected. Note that SFTR has been not tested here because it was 
disqualified under unit root tests. 
  
c. Estimation of Buoyancy Rates. 
 
 After performing unit root and co-integration tests, the estimation of buoyancy 
rates have been performed by using Equation 1. 
 
 Table 3 presents the results for the overall data from 1980 to 2004. To recall: the 
equation used was… 
 
Ln (TR) = aj + bj Ln (j) …………………. (1)  
 
Table 3 
Tax Revenue Buoyancy Rates for the period 1980-2004 
 
 
Response from… Buoyancy Rate t-Statistics Ho Is significant?  
j = GDP 0.174 5.61 Rejected Yes  
j = Money Supply (M0) 0.061 4.55 Rejected Yes  
j = Money Supply (M1) 0.021 0.71 Accepted No  
j = Money Supply (M2) 0.005 0.22 Accepted No  
j = CPI -0.073 -0.15 Accepted No  
J = Gross Investment 0.0006 0.13 Accepted No  
j = Volume of Trade 0.0885 2.6 Rejected Yes  
j = Public Debt 0.0066 0.06 Accepted No  
 
 
 
 Table 3 shows that only the tax buoyancy rates due to GDP, M0, and Volume of 
Trade are significant. However the tax buoyancy rates of volume of trade and M0 are very 
low. The tax buoyancy rate due to GDP is the highest. 
 
 
Table 4:  Summary of Result 
 
 
Variable  Unit Root Test   Co- Integrating     Significance of 
        With Tax Rev    Buoyancy Rate 
Tax Rev  Exists     _   _   
GDP   Exists    Yes   Yes 
 
Mo   Exists    Yes   Yes 
 
M1   Exists    Yes   No 
 
M2   Exists    No   No 
 
CPI   Exists    Yes   No   
Gross Inv  Exists    Yes   No 
 
Vol of Trade  Exists    Yes   Yes 
 
Public Debt  Exists    Yes   No 
 
SFTR   Do not Exist         _    _ 
 
 
Conclusions: 
  
 Table 4 shows that only statistically significant buoyancy rates were found to be 
for GDP, M0 and volume of trade. 
 
 The elasticity method has the advantage of showing precisely how the different 
economic effects come into play for determining tax revenue patterns. Thus tax revenue 
optimizers must keep the buoyancy rate information in mind to put in any tax policy. 
 
 The ineffectiveness of the overall tax regime is graphically illustrated. Tax 
revenue does not respond to growth in investment, credit, (M2) the rate of inflation and 
public debt. The response to growth in money supply and the trade/GDP is negligible 
(and likely to decline due to import liberalization incentives). Tax buoyancy to GDP is 
moderate given developing countries average bouyancy level. The lack of association 
between STFR and tax revenue indicates that STFR is not an adequate measure of tax 
evasion. Falling STFR levels show that the govt. remains content with its very modest tax 
performance.  
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